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The State and Civil Liberties in the Post-9/11 World  
 
Michael Saward 
 
 
For the final published version of this chapter, see: Saward, M., ‘The State and Civil 
Liberties in the Post-9/11 World’, in P. Dunleavy et al. (eds), Developments in British 
Politics 8 (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2006) 
 
 
 
 
On the 7th of July 2005, four suicide bombers killed over 50 people and injured many 
more on public transport in central London.  There had been many warnings since the 
attacks on the USA on 11 September 2001 that Britain was a prime terrorist target.  The 
heavy involvement of the UK in the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 was 
perceived by many as increasing the chances that Britain would be targeted, though the 
government has maintained that the invasion of Iraq had not in itself increased this threat. 
 
After ‘7/7’, Prime Minister Tony Blair declared that ‘the rules of the game have 
changed’. The ‘war on terror’ had arrived, at great human cost, on home soil.  And as the 
rules of international conflict and security had changed, he argued, so must the 
government’s approach to individual liberties in the UK; the government would need to 
change certain rules too, taking new measures in order to protect British citizens from 
terrorist threats.  Blair often repeated his view that the most basic liberty of all was the 
right to life; to protect British lives, some other civil liberties may need to be curtailed.   
 
The Government’s key response to 7/7 was the Terrorism Bill 2005, the fourth major 
piece of anti-terrorist legislation since 2000.  This legislation proposed to extend from 14 
to 90 days the length of time that suspects could be held without charge, and created new 
offences of glorifying or inciting terrorism, attending a terrorist training camp or making 
preparations for acts of terrorism.  These proposals extended and deepened challenges to 
traditional civil liberties in Britain, but in the context of ‘changed rules’.  The prime 
minister lost the vote in the House of Commons on the 90 days detention proposal in 
November 2005, though he fought for it vehemently in the face of likely defeat, arguing 
that ‘We re not living in a police state but we are living in a country that faces a real and 
serious threat of terrorism’ (BBC News, 9 November 2005).  After the vote, he claimed 
that ‘the country will think parliament has behaved in a deeply irresponsible way’; 
quoting a senior police officer, he said ‘We are not looking for legislation to hold people 
for up to three months simply because it is an easy option.  It is absolutely vital.  To 
prevent further attacks we must have it’ (The Sunday Times, 13 November 2005).  In 
short: the people want and need protection from proven, immediate threat; the measures 
needed may be extraordinary, but they are also necessary. 
 
The Blair Government’s anti-terrorism laws have been at the core of heated debate about 
security, civil liberties, and the proper understanding of (and relationships between) the 
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two.  Challenging traditional civil liberties in the face of external threats is not new in 
Britain, as I shall describe briefly in a moment.  But varied voices accusing the Blair 
government of chipping away at time-honoured citizen rights and liberties have invoked 
more than the government’s approach to the war on terror.  Policies concerning, for 
example, asylum-seekers, the planned introduction of identity cards, action on anti-social 
behaviour and the challenge to the right to trial by jury have been framed by critics as 
evidence of a government that places too little value on basic citizen liberties.  There is 
even speculative talk about the emergence of a new type of state, one whose regulation of 
the behaviour of citizens runs deeper than before in a democracy, giving rise to concerns 
about the ‘security state’, or even ‘post-democracy’. 
 
In this chapter, I review some of the policies and debates at the heart of these events and 
concerns.  I then move on to explore some of the key terms in which this debate has been 
conducted.  Underlying this exploration is a conviction that the amount and style of 
democracy in systems, like that of the UK, which we characteristically call ‘democratic’, 
is never static; ‘democracy’ is a label as well as a thing, and there is much dispute about 
what institutions and attitudes that label should be applied to.  Both the substance and the 
symbolism of British democracy shift and change in the context of these debates about 
civil liberties.  I shall suggest, in the final section of the chapter, that competing 
conceptions of democracy run underneath many of the debates about civil liberties and 
the protection of citizens. 
 
These issues are very much of the moment.  But this is far from being the first era in 
which critical observers have perceived governments encroaching on basic rights and 
liberties; equally, is it the first time that governments have perceived the need to take 
steps to curtail the liberties of those they see as posing dangers to the polity or the 
society.  Taking the ‘long view’ serves to remind us that such disputes are centuries old.  
Momentous questions of the liberty of the subject go back to Magna Carta in 1215 at 
least.  Habeas corpus, the right of the individual not to be subject to arbitrary arrest, has 
been part of English law since the late seventeenth century.  These principles are part of a 
broad and complex historical trajectory of rendering the executive accountable to 
parliament and through the latter to the people.  There are many historical examples of 
these rights and liberties being challenged by governments.  In the late eighteenth 
century, Prime Minister William Pitt’s government arrested and charged with treason 
several people suspected of dangerous sympathies with the anti-republican ideals of the 
French Revolution.  The unsuccessful trials that followed were conducted in the name of 
national security.  The fear of France under Napoleon, and over Irish rebellion in 1871, 
saw suspensions of habeas corpus and the use of detention without trial respectively.   
 
More recently, the Defence of the Realm Act of 1914 imposed wide powers of 
internment and of restrictions of liberty. Shortly prior to the outbreak of World War II, 
the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act authorized the Home Secretary to lock people up 
on the basis of his belief that a person was ‘of hostile origin or associations’.  The so-
called ‘troubles’ in Northern Ireland from the 1960s to the 1990s saw several pieces of 
legislation authorizing detention without trial.  The perception that recent anti-terrorist 
legislation undermines civil liberties has its own reasons and style (and there are new and 
 3 
distinct characteristics to the threats that the government has based its justification for 
legislation upon), but there is a rich historical context into which all of the current debates 
fit (Bindman 2005). 
 
I. Policies in question 
 
Fears about the undermining of civil liberties under the Blair government have centred 
mostly upon anti-terrorism legislation.  But those fears, and accusations, are often 
expressed with respect to other policies of the government, notably around asylum-
seekers and identity cards.  Asylum-seeking and immigration (legal and illegal) have 
become hot political issues around the world, not least across the European Union, in 
recent years.  In the past twenty years, asylum applications to EU states have grown 
enormously.  The peak was in 1992, where the number of applications was over 684,000 
(up from 50,000 in 1983).  The number in 2002 was 381,600 (Loescher 2003).  Over this 
period, Germany was the largest recipient of asylum applications in Europe, though 
Britain took that mantle from 2000.  In each of the years from 1998 to 2001, Britain 
received over 90,000 asylum applications and over 110,000 in 2002.   
 
Under the Blair government, there have been a range of measures, legislative and 
administrative, designed to limit the number of asylum applications.  Border control 
measures at points of entry into the country have been increased.  Detention of those 
whose claims have been refused has risen in prominence.  Detention, in centres such as 
the UK’s largest, Yarls Wood in Bedforshire, has been controversial.  Accusations of 
racist abuse by staff, the lack of educational provision for children in detention, and a 
lack of safety for women and children in detention have been prominent (The Guardian, 
27 July 2005).  Benefits have also been an issue; the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act 
took asylum-seekers out of the UK benefits system and introduced shopping vouchers for 
refugees.  This was seen as a way to make asylum-seeking in the UK a less attractive 
option to those considering fleeing to the country.  Under the Asylum and Immigration 
Act 2004, benefits in some parts of the UK could be withdrawn from asylum-seekers 
whose applications had failed, giving rise to fears that families could become homeless 
and face the prospect that their children might be taken into care (The Guardian, 10 
August 2005).  From the government’s point of view, controlling the numbers of asylum-
seekers was a question of the integrity of borders and internal security.  Its actions were 
variously heckled and supported by often sensationalist tabloid newspaper headlines 
likening the numbers of refugees coming (or potentially coming) to the UK as a ‘flood’ , 
and linking asylum-seekers to criminal activity and terrorist threats (Huysmans 2005).   
 
Concerns about the treatment of asylum-seekers centred upon the withdrawal of benefit 
rights and the undesirable conditions in which they were detained or maintained.  These 
were matters of civil rights, along with concerns bout the deportation of failed asylum-
seekers to countries where they may face danger.  A very different issue that nevertheless 
sometimes became linked to asylum-seeking (and indeed anti-terrorism legislation) was 
the government’s proposal to introduce identity cards for UK citizens.  The Identity 
Cards Bill of 2005 was seen by the government as a means to combat illegal immigration, 
fraud, terrorism, organized crime and theft of identity.  Critics raised concerns about what 
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the information on the identity cards (which would include biometric data on individuals) 
could be used for, and worried that their introduction could lead to the criminalization of 
many who refused to carry them.  Many critics have viewed identity cards as potentially 
undermining the liberties of UK citizens. 
 
Issues of asylum and identity cards have in recent years increasingly been linked to anti-
terrorist measures. Often ill-informed commentary linked refugees to the import of the 
terrorist threat into Britain; and debates around identity cards have regularly included 
disputes about whether their introduction would or would not assist authorities in 
protecting citizens against terrorist threats on UK soil.  But it is on anti-terrorist 
legislation itself that the most prominent debates about civil liberties have taken place. 
 
There are four pieces of legislation which have defined the Blair Government’s response 
to what it perceives as an immediate threat from terrorism.  The first is the Terrorism Act 
(2000).  Building on prior laws arising from the longstanding situation in Ireland, this Act 
offered broad definition of terrorism and associated offences and gave power to proscribe 
organizations deemed to pose terrorist threats to the UK.  It also: 
 
- Enhanced powers to seize terrorist property and disrupt terrorist financial activity 
- Granted police powers with regard to terrorist investigations (e.g. stop and search 
powers) 
- Created several offences specific to terrorism, such as fund raising, dealing with 
proscribed groups in various ways, and training terrorists 
- Required an annual report for the operation of the Act to Parliament 
 
More controversial was the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) (2001).  
This was legislation passed in the wake of the attacks on the USA of 11 September 2001, 
and amounts to the first major response by the British Government to those attacks.  The 
main provision of ATCSA concerned detention without trial of foreign nationals 
suspected of involvement in terrorism.  The government saw extended detention as 
necessary, partly because international law prohibited the deportation of suspects where 
their lives may be in danger.  At the same time, the government maintained that ‘although 
law enforcement agencies may have strong grounds for suspecting involvement in 
terrorism, little of the evidence would be admissible in a criminal court or would be 
impossible to reveal in Court without exposing sensitive capabilities or endangering 
sources of information (‘International Terrorism’, Home Office).  Further powers under 
the Act involved the creation of offences related to hoaxes involving dangerous 
substances and further tools to combat the financing of suspected terrorist activities.  The 
Act also gave the police more powers to hold and question suspects. 
 
This Act was targeted by many for its overturning longstanding British judicial 
principles, particularly in its legitimizing of indefinite imprisonment of suspects without 
charge or trial.  Detainees could not see the evidence against them or have it tested before 
a court in the usual way.  There was a special secure court without a jury called SIAC, to 
which a limited number of lawyers were allowed access, which could hear appeals by 
detainees.  Eleven men were detained under the Act and were held in Belmarsh prison in 
 5 
south London, without charge.  Nine of them appealed to the highest court in the country, 
the House of Lords, in the latter half of 2004.  The detainees’ lawyers argued that the 
relevant measures in the ATCSA ‘were an affront to democracy and the intentionally 
accepted notion of justice’ (The Independent, 5 October 2004). 
 
 The Law Lords, the highest court in the UK, ruled, in December 2004, that detention 
without trial as expressed under the Act contravened the European Convention on Human 
Rights as it allowed detentions ‘in a way that discriminates on the ground of nationality 
or immigration status’ by justifying detention without trial for foreign suspects, but not 
Britons.  Britain has ‘derogated’ (opted out of) from the European Convention with 
respect to detention without trial. The convention allows such derogation under 
circumstances amounting to an emergency situation in face of imminent threat to the 
country. But the Law Lords were scathing in declaring this unlawful.  Lord Hoffmann 
argued that ‘The real threat to the life of the nation … comes not from terrorism but from 
laws such as these’ (quoted in The Observer, 19 December 2004).   
 
The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, which was passed by parliament after heated 
debate in April 2005, was effectively the Government’s response to the House of Lords 
ruling on ATCSA.  The Lords declared the sections of ATCSA which dealt with 
detention of foreign terrorist suspects incompatible with European human rights law on 
two basic grounds: it was discriminatory in that it singled out non British citizens, and 
that it was a disproportionate response that did not justify Britain opting out of the 
relevant European human rights laws.  The Prevention of Terrorism Act essentially 
replaces detention of suspects by a process of ‘control orders’.  These control orders 
could take a variety of forms, the most stringent and controversial of which was ‘house 
arrest’ – a phrase commonly used in debates on the Bill but avoided by the Home 
Secretary, Charles Clarke, and his government colleagues.  Unlike the detention 
provisions in the ATCSA, these control orders could be applied equally to British 
nationals and foreign suspects.  As under ATCSA, there would be limited and restricted 
types of judicial involvement, but at the end of the day the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
grants power to the Secretary of State, acting under advice from the security services, to 
impose various restrictions on the liberty of individuals who could not be deported and 
who, if their cases were brought before the courts in the conventional manner, would be 
unlikely to receive sentences commensurate with the Home Secretary’s view of the extent 
of the threat that their activities posed.  With regard to the latter, the sensitive nature of 
the intelligence upon which these judgments would be made in the first place, and the 
inadmissibility of phone-tap evidence in the courts, also in the Government’s view made 
use of the conventional court procedures inappropriate.  After the Lords ruling on 
ATSCA, the Belmarsh detainees were released, but the majority of these men became 
subject to control orders under the new legislation. 
 
The most recent and fourth key government anti-terrorism measure, as we have seen, is 
the proposed legislation of late 2005, put together in the wake of the attacks in London in 
July.  The central elements in these new proposals were heightened government powers 
to deport people from the UK who are considered to be promoting terrorism; the 
extension of powers to detain suspects for up to 90 days without charges being laid 
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before a court; and a new offence of ‘glorifying, exalting or celebrating’ terrorism.  The 
proposed legislation also targeted incitement of terrorism and the dissemination of 
material perceived to promote terrorism.  Political opponents of the government, and civil 
liberties groups, expressed concern in particular about the increased detention provisions 
– a further challenge to basic principles of not being detained without due legal process, 
from their point of view – and about  the ambiguity of ‘glorifying’ terrorism, which they 
feared might result in much wider restrictions on freedom of speech.  Some critics asked 
whether open support for Nelson Mandela prior to the dismantling of apartheid in South 
Africa would have amounted to an offence under the proposed laws. 
 
The Blair government was defeated on these proposals in the House of Commons in 
November 2005.  Press coverage focused on the whether this defeat represented the 
beginning of the end of Blair’s prime ministership. The focus here is different; what 
interests us mostly in the present context is the how the debates surrounding such 
controversial measures invoked different visions or conceptions of democracy.  Political 
actors, in making principled and practical objections to government actions, for example, 
offer their own implicit or explicit criteria against which to judge the government or 
system’s performance. Particular political actors tend to be the ‘carriers’ or ‘purveyors’ 
of competing models of democracy.  It is to this process that I now turn, tracing some key 
threads in the debates surrounding the 2001 and 2005 antiterrorism legislation in 
particular. 
 
 
 
II. Political rhetoric and underlying ideals 
 
Debates around anti-terror legislation are replete with key words and signifiers which 
carry powerful but ambiguous resonances.  ‘Freedom’ is deployed on the side of those 
proposing restrictions on certain classes of people in the name of ‘security’.  The idea of 
the state as a provider of ‘protection’ for citizens in a democracy has played a key part 
too.  The very survival of democratic systems and practices in the face of the ‘threat’ 
posed by international terrorism is invoked by the UK Government.  The value, renewal 
and survival of democracy; and the role of the state in protecting basic democratic rights 
and freedoms; these are precisely the sorts of issues that go to the heart of what 
democracy is, and what it ought to be.  
 
A range of principles have been invoked and expounded in the debates around 
antiterrorism legislation.  A range of actors were involved – the Government, opposition 
parties and spokespersons within the parliament, opponents outside parliament such as 
civil liberties groups, the judiciary, and media figures.  A range of factors were in play in 
these tussles – the speed with which legislation was passed, the proper role of the 
judiciary within democracy, the deep historical character of the liberties of the individual 
which some perceived to be under threat (either by terrorism, or by the legislation 
designed to protect against it), the proper nature of the relative power of the executive in 
democracy, and how one might judge the extent of a ‘threat’ and therefore what might be 
a proportionate response. 
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For the Blair Government, the ‘threat’ of terrorism to the UK was immediate, constituted 
an emergency, and justified the taking of whatever steps it deemed necessary to combat 
it.  The words ‘threat’, ‘security’ and ‘protection’ have permeated Government speeches 
and documents introducing or defending the measures represented in the ATCSA 2001 
and the PTA 2005.  This has not simply been one thread amongst others in the Blair 
Government’s approach to its governing tasks in recent years, but very much at the center 
of its rhetoric and specific proposals.  Consider the Queen’s Speech of November 2004, 
which was described as follows: 
 
The government’s programme is overwhelmingly dominated by issues relating to 
crime, anti-social behaviour and, most obviously, security.  It is littered with 
references to the threat from global terrorism and the fact that we all live in a 
‘changing and uncertain world’.  And its tone is set by a series of measures 
including proposals for ID cards, an organized crime bill and a counter terrorism 
bill, all designed to address what Tony Blair believes is the greatest challenge of 
the modern world (BBC News, November 2004). 
 
          
The world is changing, the country faces grave threats, and must act in a way which is 
adequate to this threat.  The nature of the challenge is unprecedented; in Blair’s own 
words, ‘Here in this country and in other nations round the world, laws will be changed, 
not to deny basic liberties but to prevent their abuse and protect the most basic liberty of 
all: freedom from terror’ (quoted in Huysmans 2004, 325).  Note too that this is very 
much a national agenda.  Although civil liberties campaigners and others applauded the 
Blair government’s passing of the Human Rights Act (1998), which incorporated into 
British law the European Convention on Human Rights (discussed below), derogation or 
opting out of provisions of the Act under certain specified circumstances has been a core 
part of the government’s measures against terrorist threats (as we saw, the Law Lords’ 
important ruling of late 2004 contradicted key grounds of such derogation).  The 
Government has been keen to see that European law does not undercut, as it sees it, 
efforts to protect UK citizens.  For example, proposed new EU rules announced in 
September 2005 regarding rights of appeal for failed asylum seekers and illegal 
immigrants, how long they can be held, and safeguards with respect to returning 
deportees to countries where they may face torture, raised concerns within the 
government that their plans to deport terrorist suspects would not be able to go ahead.  
Home Secretary Charles Clarke has made it clear, in such cases, that he would act where 
possible to circumvent European restrictions, notably by signing bilateral memorandums 
of understanding against torture with the governments of nations to which deportees may 
be sent.  The general point is that the British government has assumed its right to act as it 
sees fit in the face of new threats in a changed world; democracy and protection are a 
national matter before they are questions of European or other international standards or 
charters. 
 
Clearly, this is democracy in ‘protective’ mode.  The job of government is to protect the 
people, and to regard as important but secondary qualms about marginal restrictions on 
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people’s liberties where such restrictions bolster protection.  New times and new 
uncertainties demand protective democratic action by government.  Now, of course, 
protective measures beyond the normal remit of the law can only be acceptable if the 
character and immediacy of the new threats are such that they justify such measures.  The 
prime minister (and Home Secretary Charles Clarke’s) view that the rules of the game 
had changed after 7/7, meant (presumably) that further restrictions on certain civil 
liberties in the name of a wider security may be needed, and that the government would 
not hesitate to introduce them.  Government underlining and reinforcing of the sense of 
immediate and highly dangerous threat to the British people is ubiquitous.  The Home 
Office’s own briefing paper on ‘International Terrorism’ provides a flavour of this case.  
It outlines ‘the nature of the terrorist threat we face and how it differs from previous 
threats of this kind’, noting that to ‘protect’ is a key part of the necessary response.  
Throughout, though, the aim is ‘reconciling liberty and security’, acting ‘without 
compromising the openness of our society or the freedoms we value’.  ‘Liberty with 
security’ is the goal.  But it must be realized that the threat amounts to an ‘emergency’, 
and ‘democratic governments have long accepted that such emergencies may justify 
some temporary and limited curtailment of individual rights where this is essential to 
preserve wider freedoms and security’.  The government has found such actions 
‘necessary’, because it is dealing with ‘an unprecedented challenge’.  So altering the laws 
so that for example forms of detention without the normal legal processes, control orders, 
limited judicial involvement, and new restrictions on freedom of speech, could be legal is 
a response to a threat that is both grave and new.   
 
Although measures to deal with this threat are not permanent, no one should expect that 
they would not be needed for some time: ‘we need to recognize the resilience of the 
terrorists.  This is not a threat which can be overcome quickly or where negotiation is 
possible (Home Office Paper 2, p.1).  That fact is reinforced by ministers conveying their 
sense of the character of the enemy – it is not one thing, in one place, or even readily 
seeable or identifiable.  As the then Home Secretary stated in the House of Commons in 
October 2002, ‘alQaeda and its offshoots’ have ‘a network of cells and the loose 
confederation of those who are not parts of its central core but who are prepared to 
support and help it’.  In formulating laws and other measures to combat this amorphous, 
highly dangerous and immediate threat, Mr. Blunkett (a controversial figure, seen as a 
realistic progressive by supporters and an illiberal reactionary by his critics) wanted 
answers, not arguments which failed to recognize the threat’s nature: ‘All I want is that 
people come up with solutions, not with objections, because in the end the primary duty 
of Government is to protect our citizens from the undermining of their freedoms and 
democracy by those who know no bounds and have no understanding of the issues of 
punishment or prosecution when they take the lives of others through suicide bombing’ 
(House of Commons debates, 23 February 2004). 
 
One can also see in the government’s approach the effort to instill a sense of common 
purpose in the face of the ‘threat’.  As Charles Clarke, Mr. Blunkett’s successor as Home 
Secretary, said in the House of Commons in 2005 in the debate about the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act,  
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Al-Qaeda and its associates have a strategy to destroy the central themes of our 
democratic society, and this House must decide how best we can address that 
threat.  In so doing, we must seek to analyse and understand the threat that we 
face, which we have done – we have laid the results before this House and are 
trying directly to assess the threat … we must acknowledge that British citizens as 
well as non-British citizens are focused on the target of seeking to destroy through 
terrorist activity the society that we seek to represent (House of Commons 
debates, 28 February 2005). 
 
There are various threads in the government’s style and rhetoric that are worth noting 
(and which I will pick up again in the chapter’s final section).  First, its approach implies 
that it is acting as the defender of basic rights and liberties.  Most often, the government 
expresses this view in terms of its defence of the most basic liberty, that of freedom from 
terror, or of the most basic right, that to life.  In the words of Tony Blair, the government 
has sought to ‘protect the most basic civil liberty of all, which is the right to life on behalf 
of our citizens’ (The Guardian, 16 September 2005).  Secondly, it asserts strongly its 
right as a national government to protect its citizens as it sees fit, within its European and 
international obligations where essential but by taking a separate legal or administrative 
path where it perceives that as necessary and feasible.  Thirdly, the government is fond in 
these debates of the discourse of ‘balance’.  The relationship between civil liberties and 
security in the changed world carries key questions of striking the ‘right balance’ 
between the two.   
 
The Government has been careful not to deny the importance of fundamental civil 
liberties.  But the talk of balance is quite explicit in its aim to revisit, and if necessary to 
curb with reluctance and limitations, some cherished civil liberties.  Related to this, 
fourth, the government sees the balance between the executive and the judiciary in the 
UK shifting somewhat in this context.  It is careful not to speak of undermining the 
traditional role of the courts in the UK system, least of all the judiciary’s right to review 
the legality of legislation.  But its anti-terrorist measures have been seen by many in the 
judiciary (as we shall see briefly below) as challenging age-old patterns of balance 
between the executive and judicial branches of government in the UK.  The government’s 
interpretation of ‘balance’ does not, on the whole, sit comfortably with other notions of 
constitutional balance between these separate arms of the British state.  Finally, the 
rhetorical justifications built around the terms ‘protection’ and ‘security’ carry particular 
interpretations of what and who needs protection and security.  It is very much the British 
people, and its way of life, that needs protection and security.  That sounds perfectly 
uncontroversial, and in one sense it is.  But, as we shall see, it is not the only 
interpretation. 
 
Interestingly, talk of striking a new ‘balance’ between protecting Britons from terrorism 
and civil liberties also received support from other sections of the executive branch of the 
UK government.  The head of Britain’s security service, MI5, Dame Eliza Manningham-
Buller, spoke in September 2005 of the difficulties of protecting citizens within the law 
when unclear intelligence leads authorities to believe that a terrorist attack is being 
planned, but where there is insufficient evidence to lead to charges being laid 
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successfully.  She defended the importance of civil liberties and ‘hard-fought for’ rights, 
but noted that ‘the world has changed and there needs to be a debate on whether some 
erosion of what we all value may be necessary to improve  the chances of our citizens not 
being blown apart as they go about their daily lives’ (BBC News, 10 September 2005). 
 
Other actors saw this ‘balance’ differently.  Opinion in the judiciary was not uniform by 
any means, but there were many strong judicial criticisms of the key features of the 
legislation discussed here.  The importance of the rule of law in a democracy was an 
important theme in judicial criticism; one of the Law Lords who ruled that the ATCSA 
provisions on detention without trial were unlawful, Lord Nicholls, said in his ruling that 
‘Indefinite imprisonment without charge or trial as anathema in any country which 
observes the rule of law’ (BBC News, 14 December 2004).  One High or Appeal Court 
judge, speaking anonymously, expressed great concern about the PTA’s ‘control orders’ 
in a similar concern for the basic rule of law in a democracy: ‘It has to be pointed out to 
the public that these quite draconian measures apply to them – not just to bad people but 
to everybody.  They may think that the government will only apply them to bad people 
but there is a risk that they will be applied to cases where they’re not justified’.  Another 
High Court judge added: ‘I think the executive takes too much power in relation to 
terrorism and in relation to shutting people up without trial’ (The Guardian, 26 April 
2005).   
 
Tony Blair warned in 2005 that he would have ‘a lot of battles’ with the courts if they 
acted to block the deportation of extremists, talking of renouncing part of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (The Independent, 11 August 2005).  In return, senior 
judges have told the government that they would fight ‘root and branch’ any moves to 
undermine the independence of the judiciary.  High level invocation of democracy has 
been a key part of judicial warning shots aimed at the government’s rhetoric over its anti-
terrorist measures.  A deputy High Court judge, Lord Carlile, said that ‘If the 
Government undermines the judiciary, then the judiciary might be tempted to undermine 
the Government … If we get into that state of affairs we undermine democracy.  That is 
something the judiciary won’t do, and the Government would be foolish to do it’ (The 
Independent, 11 August 2005).  A former Law Lord, Lord Clyde, said that ‘The 
importance of the independence of the judiciary … is beyond question.  The function of 
the judiciary is to uphold the constitution.  If a judge … considers the constitution and the 
Human Rights Convention is in peril, he must act accordingly.  This is vital for 
democracy’ (The Independent, 11 August 2005).  Here we can see that questions of 
‘balance’ from the government’s point of view are interpreted as an imbalance, a 
challenge or potential challenge to the basic principle of judicial independence. 
 
The lawyers for the nine foreign terror suspects detained in Belmarsh prison were, not 
surprisingly perhaps, more fulsome in speaking of what they saw as the larger 
constitutional significance of the laws they sought to oppose.  They told the panel of nine 
law lords that the relevant measures in the ATCSA ‘were an affront to democracy and the 
internationally accepted notion of justice’. Ben Emmerson, QC, representing seven of the 
detainees, was reported as claiming that the detention provisions ‘threatened the values 
they were designed to protect’, and was quoted thus: ‘We say in a democracy it us 
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unacceptable to lock up potentially innocent people without trial or without any 
indication when, if ever, they are going to be released’ (The Independent, 5 October 
2004). 
 
The Government’s most recent proposals such as targeting the justification or 
glorification of terrorism have met with judicial criticism, along with criticism from civil 
liberties group Liberty, an organization that has been prominent in these debates.  
Addressing earlier concerns over the government’s anti-terrorism legislation, Liberty 
expressed its belief ‘that in a democracy, the values of public protection and the rule of 
law are not mutually exclusive’.  It defended the presumption of innocence, which the 
detention and ‘control order’ provisions of anti-terror legislation were seen to have 
undermined: ‘we appreciate that the presumption of innocence is never the most 
fashionable idea at times of heightened fear.  It is, however, a key distinguishing feature 
of a healthy democracy’ (Liberty, August 2004).   
 
With respect to the 2005 proposals to outlaw justification or glorification, Shami 
Chakrabarti, director of Liberty, asks ‘What is meant by “terrorism”? What kind of 
behaviour constitutes “justification”? Could this cover political debate about the 
circumstances in which it is acceptable to take up arms against non-democratic regimes 
across the world?’ (The Guardian, 24 August 2005).  Elsewhere, she said that 
‘glorification’ was so broad that it would ‘make loose talk a serious political offence’ 
(The Independent, 16 September 2005).  Critics from the judiciary, pressure groups and 
the press argued that the government already had at its disposal sufficient powers to 
prosecute those who incite violence; further legislation was unnecessary and, it has 
sometimes been suggested, involves a disturbing accretion of further powers to the 
executive. 
 
There are other critics of course – they are too numerous to mention fully here.  Geoffrey 
Bindman reinforced basic values of a liberal democracy, stressing the damage (as he saw 
it) to time-honoured individual rights and freedoms in the provisions of ATCSA: ‘For the 
first time since 1945 the executive was given power to detain indefinitely without a 
charge being laid, and, crucially, without the detainee having the opportunity of 
answering the evidence by which the detention is justified’.  He went on to argue, making 
the larger connection to the character of democracy, ‘it is a disturbing feature of current 
British and American governments … that in the guise of protecting the public they are 
ready to abandon principles which are the hallmark of democracy’ (Bindman2005).  
Journalist George Monbiot was even more forthright.  Criticizing provisions such as the 
Terrorism Act 2000 for placing restrictions on legitimate protest, he wrote: ‘Democracies 
such as ours will come to an end not with the stamping of boots and the hoisting of flags, 
but thorough the slow accretion of a thousand dusty codicils’ (The Guardian, 3 August 
2004).  Blick and Weir, writing in the context of the 2005 proposals, argue for an urgent 
answer to the question of how effective the government’s anti-terrorist proposals might 
be considering that the government’s strategy and laws ‘will have a profound effect on 
British democracy, the rule of law, criminal justice, the conduct of police and security 
forces, civil and political rights and the shape of community relations perhaps for 
generations to come’ (Blick and Weir 2005). 
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A Labour dissenter from the Government’s proposals in the PTA, former foreign 
secretary the late Robin Cook, articulated one key plank of a liberal conception of 
democracy in these debates when he addressed ministers’ arguments that ‘the safety of 
the public must come before the liberty of the individual’: this is fine when it is your 
safety and somebody else’s civil liberty.  But liberty is indivisible.  A measure that 
curtails the liberty of one citizen necessarily curtails the liberty of every citizen’ (The 
Guardian, 4 March 2005).  Leader of the Liberal Democrats, Charles Kennedy, offered a 
similar appraisal in his comments on the PTA proposals.  He criticized this as one of a set 
of ‘extremely repressive measures’; he pledge to defend the ‘hard-won civil liberties’ that 
have served ‘generations of Britons very well’ (BBC News, 20 December 2004).   
 
Of course, critics aim at different targets, argue in diverse ways, and seek to defend a 
diversity of institutions and values. Nevertheless, it is not stretching things too far to 
suggest that there are some central threads that bring together judicial, civil liberties and 
other critics.  Government opponents point out that a range of rights and liberties need to 
be protected at all times; to quote Chakrabarti, ‘We need to focus on what unites us in the 
struggle against terrorism – our fundamental values.  These values are human rights; the 
bedrock of our beliefs, not a convenience, a luxury or a pick and mix’ (Refugee Council 
News, 26 August 2005).  Secondly, critics tend to support strongly the independence of 
the judiciary and the fundamental and unshifting character of the rights and liberties that 
the judiciary exists to defend.  Third, the European and international rights obligations on 
the Government are non-negotiable, not optional according to circumstances. Fourth, the 
idea of ‘balance’ between security and liberty is regarded as suspect; instead, especially 
from the point of view of judicial critics, the ‘balance’ within the constitutional structure 
of British government between the powers of the executive and the judiciary is the most 
crucial balance to be sustained. 
 
A good deal of these debates revolves around what actions, moral imperatives and laws 
are most ‘basic’ or ‘fundamental’.  In this context it is instructive to consider briefly the 
life and times of the Human Rights Act (1988), which I have mentioned only in passing 
so far.  After many years of debate in the UK, the 1998 Act incorporated into UK law the 
European convention on human rights, effectively making the convention a codified and 
vital part of the British constitution.  The Act contains provisions regarding the right to 
life, prohibition of torture, the right to a fair trial, rights to privacy, freedom of thought 
and conscience and religion, freedom of expression and assembly, and the prohibition of 
discrimination.  The courts cannot strike down legislation on the basis of the Act, but 
they can rule that legislation is incompatible with its provisions, and leave the response to 
that ruling to government and parliament.  The Act has been subject to controversy.  
Sections of the media have highlighted how, in their view, it has benefited unworthy 
groups such as travelers, prisoners, illegal immigrants and terrorist suspects. With regard 
to anti-terrorist laws, David Blunkett when Home Secretary warned judges that curtailing 
civil liberties in the fight against terrorism was a matter for the parliament, not the courts 
(The Guardian, 25 September 2001); Tony Blair has argued that ‘Should legal obstacles 
arise, we will legislate further, if necessary, amending the Human Rights Act in respect 
of the interpretation of the European convention on human rights’ (quoted in The 
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Guardian, 31 October 2005).  Opponents of this view espoused the Act’s ‘fundamental’ 
character, arguing that the government and parliament must operate within it rather than 
seek to challenge or modify its provisions; defenders of the government’s view stressed 
the ‘basic’ role of the government in providing ‘security’.  Labour’s willingness to amend 
the Act has been surpassed by the Conservative party’s action in setting up a commission 
to explore the ‘reform, replacement or repeal’ of the legislation.  The Shadow Home 
Secretary, David Davis, said that ‘Once we had inherited English liberties; now we have 
incorporated European rights … once, the law limited the state and enlarged the sphere in 
which the citizen could be free; now, it imposes obligations on the state and limits the 
freedom of the citizen’ (quoted in The Guardian, 23 August 2004). 
 
III. Security and protection: two competing ideas of democracy 
 
We have seen, even on this brief account, how different actors prioritized different 
principles and (as they saw it) necessities in the post-9/11 political context.  There is 
widespread agreement that contemporary democracies face huge challenges.  My 
intention has been to trace the contrasts in conceptions of democracy itself, as revealed 
by principles and values enunciated in the relevant debates by a range of actors.  In this 
final section I will try to map out more explicitly what I see as the key such contrast. 
 
Government and critics both would recognize that they seek a ‘protective’ democracy.  
But the focus and style of the protection concerned differs markedly.  The following 
account is stylized and simplified, but it is one job of political theorists to try to draw out 
the links between disparate threads in day to day political debate, and to show what 
principled positions are at stake at a more basic level. 
 
The Government’s position can be called a ‘majoritarian protective’ model of democracy 
(here, I draw partly upon models of democracy outlined by authors such as Lijphart 
(1999) and Held (1996)).  This model displays a number of key features, which will be 
familiar from the above account in varying degrees.  First, although proponents of this 
model would agree that certain civil rights and liberties are fundamental, there is a view 
that the ranking of such rights can shift and change according to political and other 
circumstances.  So, for example, in the face of a new style of terrorist threat, the right to 
life or the right to basic security assumes a greater relative importance than the right to 
free speech, the right to free movement, or the right to legal due process.  Implicit within 
this view is an idea that rights and liberties are, albeit to some limited degree that is 
difficult to specify, the gift of the state and not necessarily the inviolable prior possession 
of the free citizen   Secondly, this model respects the constitutional role of the judiciary 
in democracies, but nonetheless reserves the right for the democratically accountable 
executive to respond to the perceived fears of citizens by encroaching on established 
judicial principles or routines, in extraordinary circumstances.  The elected executive, in 
other words, is the first among equals when it comes to fundamental issues of protection 
of (assumed) most fundamental citizen rights and liberties.  Its proper concern lies with 
the shorter term impact of protective measures on a minority who pose dangers.  Third, 
this model is unapologetically national, regarding the nation-state as the primary location 
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for the enunciation of political interest and the interpretation of the appropriate scope and 
application of rights and liberties.   
 
Fourth, it assumes that ‘protection’ (and security) should be interpreted in terms of threats 
to citizens posed by individuals and groups who target the society – enemies, internal and 
external ones, are what we need protection against.  Fifth, this perspective recognizes that 
‘balances’ are important in questions about rights and liberties, and it interprets balance 
as being one between liberty, on the one hand, and security or protection from enemies 
on the other.  The majoritarian protective model sees within this need for ‘balance’ the 
possibility of limited but legitimate trade-offs of some measure of liberty in the name of 
security and protection.  Sixth, this model sees the state as a set of institutions which must 
change and adapt, often in drastic ways, to new threats and circumstances; sometimes it is 
necessary to change the rules.  And finally, these changes are carried through in the name 
of most people, or all citizens, or the ‘vast majority’.  It is a model of democracy with a 
populist, majoritarian character. 
 
The model of the critics, I suggest, is best referred to as a ‘constitutional protective’ 
model of democracy.  According to this view, fundamental rights and liberties are not the 
gift of the state but pre-exist the state.  They are the inalienable possession of free 
citizens.  Secondly, this model defends the strong judicial function of protecting those 
rights and liberties, and sees this function as fundamentally democratic even if judges are 
not themselves elected political actors (for theoretical accounts of the ‘self-binding 
character of democracy, see Elster and Slagstad 1988, and Saward 1998).  The primary 
concern of its advocates is the potential longer term impact of measures on the rights and 
freedoms of all, not a minority.  Thirdly, this model is more internationalist than the 
majoritarian protective model.  It takes especially seriously international obligations and 
EU law, and denies that there can be a legitimate set of opt outs from such obligations.  
Fourthly, the question of ‘balance’ is differently conceived; here, it is a question of 
constitutional balance between the executive and the judiciary.  Fifthly, it is highly 
skeptical that, in any fundamental way, the rules have changed.  Constitutional 
protections in democracy are sacrosanct, they remain the bedrock of the rules of the 
system and even new and virulent threats are best combated by deepening and defending 
those rules, rather than seeking to modify them.  It is not the rules that change; the 
context changes, but the rules remain.  Finally, and crucially, the constitutional protective 
approach highlights the need for the protection of citizens’ rights and liberties against the 
state itself.  Constitutionalists are wary of states grabbing powers, aware that powers 
adopted or created are rarely, if ever, given up.  They are also suspicious that the targets 
of new, restrictive laws will be the only targets in future – for example, restrictions on the 
freedom on speech and movement of a suspect minority today may in time become 
restrictions on a larger set of citizens, possibly even a majority, in the further future.  One 
can see the suspicion of the over-mighty state in the efforts by some critics to promote 
time limits on the application of some new laws. 
 
Some prominent theorists of democracy, including MacPherson (1977), have described 
what they call the ‘protective model of democracy.  The most important classical theorist 
of this ‘model’ is arguably the great English utilitarian theorist Jeremy Bentham.  In 
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general terms, it is no doubt a core responsibility of a democratic government to protect 
its citizen’s lives and freedoms from external threat.  But the central thread of the so-
called protective model has pointed in a quite different direction.  Consider the words of 
Bentham: 
 
A democracy, then, has for its characteristic object and effect, the securing its 
members against oppression and depredation at the hands of those functionaries 
which it employs for its defence … Every other species of government has 
necessarily, for its characteristic and primary object and effect, the keeping the 
people and non-functionaries in a perfectly defenceless state, against the 
functionaries their rulers … (quoted in MacPherson 1977, 36) 
 
Or, as the legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron has put it recently: 
 
True, the events of September 11 have heightened our fear of the worst that can 
be done to us by individuals and groups other than the state.  And an increase in 
the power of the state may be necessary to prevent or diminish the prospect of that 
horror. But the existence of a threat from terrorist attack does not diminish the 
threat that liberals have traditionally apprehended from the state.  The former 
complements the latter; it doe not diminish it, and it may enhance it (Waldron 
2003: 205; italics in the original). 
 
 
Conclusion 
Tony Blair has emphasized at different points in his premiership that his government is 
interested in what works, not ideologically-driven policy.  But even if leaders and 
governments do not profess ideologies, invariably there are discernible threads in their 
thought and actions.  One such thread in a series of policies and initiatives under Blair, 
especially in the broad area of criminal justice policy, has been to challenge and emphasis 
on individual rights and liberties and to seek a rebalancing in favour of community, 
obligation, and the rights of victims.  At times this has become explicit, as for example in 
Blair’s ‘respect’ agenda, around which the government created a key position of 
‘coordinator for respect, sometimes called a ‘czar’, occupied by Louise Casey.  After 
outlining a series of policy proposals designed to tackle ‘anti-social behaviour’ and 
putting victim rights and redress at he heart of criminal justice, the prime minister 
stressed the broader moral agenda:  
a modern civic society, underpinned by reformed public services and an active 
welfare state, won't emerge simply through better laws, tougher enforcement of 
obligations, sanctions and more police. As well as modernising the Criminal 
Justice System and tackling anti-social behaviour we also need to revive the spirit 
of community and social cohesion. As Martin Luther King argued in the 1960s' 
struggle for civil rights, laws 'restrain the heartless; they cannot change the heart' . 
. .  Only by rebuilding cohesive communities and reforming our criminal justice 
system can we achieve our vision of a strong and fair society. It means 
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abandoning the rhetoric and false choices of the past. Since 1945 our politics has 
too often failed to articulate a coherent response to crime and anti-social 
behaviour. Restoring civic responsibility is not a betrayal of social justice, but 
essential for its realisation’ (quoted in The Observer, 10 November 2002).   
Among the most prominent government policies within the broad range of this agenda 
were anti-social behaviour disorders (ASBOs), introduced in 1999; ASBOs can apply to 
anyone found to harass or alarm neighbours or neighbourhoods.  A series of related 
measures have been enacted by the government over its life addressing the rights of 
victims for example – and in 2005 the prime minister signalled his intention to intensify 
this programme, through tackling binge drinking and other low-level anti-social 
behaviour by on-the-spot fines, seizing the property of offending families, appointing 
local anti-social behaviour ‘sheriffs’, introducing ‘baby ASBOs’ for under-10s, and so 
on.  This vision of community, respect, and obligation permeates these developments 
accompanied by criticisms from other parties, community workers and parts of 
Whitehall. The anti-social behaviour and respect programmes form part of a populist 
vision of instilling a sense of obligation and community into citizens, indeed to mould 
citizens in a particular way. Protecting victims and the vulnerable is a key part of the 
rhetoric at least.   
It is not stretching things too far to see close links between the government’s anti-terrorist 
legislation and its broader agenda, as expressed through its respect and related agendas.  
Both display what I have called a majoritarian protective outlook on how democracy 
should be shaped and function.  Likewise, critics of this agenda point to the dangers that 
civil rights and liberties are being placed under threat by the broader thrust of the 
government’s criminal justice reforms: the essence of the position of the constitutional 
protective vision of democracy.  The fascinating connection between these two visions, 
as played out in anti-terrorist debates and beyond, lies in the internal tensions in the idea 
of states ‘protecting’ citizens.  Amid the bluster and argument of day-to-day politics, 
basic conceptions of what democracy is, who it protects from what and why, face off 
against each other.  For some, the rules of the game have changed.  For others, changed 
circumstances make the old rules more relevant than ever. 
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